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OPINION OF THE COURT  
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
 Plaintiffs collectively appeal the district court’s 
dismissal of their claims against Management Resource 
Systems (“MRS”).  The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
claim that a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) 
obligated MRS to make employee benefit contributions and 
submit to audits pursuant to a separate “me-too” agreement 
between MRS and the Plaintiffs.  The district court dismissed 
the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), agreeing with MRS that the complaint 
did not sufficiently plead that MRS is bound by the CBA.  
Because we disagree, we will reverse the district court’s 
dismissal of the complaint. 
 
  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 Plaintiffs are union and management sponsored trust 
funds and employee benefit plans that represent construction 
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industry employees.1  MRS is a corporation that constructs 
commercial buildings.2  At least insofar as this dispute is 
concerned, the relationship between Plaintiffs and MRS 
began in the 1990s.  In 1994 and again in 1997, MRS signed 
assent letters (or “me-too” agreements) binding it to CBAs 
bestowing various rights on Plaintiffs.  Pursuant to the 1997 
assent letter at issue here, MRS agreed to be bound by a more 
comprehensive agreement (“1997-2001 CBA”), which was 
then in force between the Interior Finish Contractors 
Association (“IFCA”), a multiemployer association, and the 
union (both Plaintiffs/Appellants).   
 
 According to Plaintiffs, by signing the 1997 letter, 
MRS also agreed to be bound by a later CBA (“2012-2015 
CBA”).  They claim the 1997 letter contains an “evergreen 
clause” that empowers the union and IFCA to negotiate 
successor agreements that bind MRS.  Plaintiffs assert that 
this delegation of negotiating authority remained in force 
because MRS never gave Plaintiffs the notice required to 
terminate the 1997 letter’s evergreen clause.  MRS concedes 
that it never gave notice of termination.  However, it disputes 
the Plaintiffs’ characterization of the letter agreement.  MRS 
denies that the letter continuously granted bargaining rights.  
                                              
1 The district court identified the Plaintiffs as:  “Carpenters 
Health and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Annuity Fund 
of Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters Savings Fund of 
Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters Joint Apprentice 
Committee, Carpenters Political Action Committee of 
Philadelphia and Vicinity, Carpenters International Training 
Fund, Edward Coryell, Interior Finish Contractors 
Association of Delaware Valley Industry Advancement 
Program, and Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.”  
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. 
Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 
2395152, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015). 
2 Id. at *1 n.1.  Douglas Marion, Vice President of MRS, is 
also charged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint.  Plaintiffs claim that 
Marion assumed guarantor liability by signing the agreements 
on behalf of MRS. 
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Thus, according to MRS, it is not bound by the 2012-2015 
CBA. 
 
Under the 2012-2015 CBA and its predecessor 1997-
2001 CBA, employers must make specified contributions to 
various funds of the Plaintiffs and they must permit audits of 
records relevant to their obligations to employees.  For 
instance, the contested 2012-2015 CBA states that the 
“Employer shall . . . pay . . . a sum . . . for each hour worked 
for a Pension and Annuity contribution.”3  With respect to 
audits, the CBA provides that the  
 
Employer shall . . . permit such 
agent during regular business 
hours to inspect and make copies 
of any and all records of the 
Employer pertaining to 
compensation paid to employees, 
hours worked by employees, 
monies withheld from employees 
for taxes . . . . The Parties hereto 
recognize and agree that the 
[union] has an obligation and 
right to collect monies owed the 
Fringe Benefit Funds by the 
Employer and/or owed to the 
[union] . . . .4 
 
Plaintiffs sent MRS several requests for audits because they 
believed that MRS had failed to make contributions required 
by the 2012-2015 CBA.5  They filed this suit when MRS did 
not comply.  Plaintiffs asked for (1) injunctive relief requiring 
                                              
3 App. at A61. 
4 Id. at A74-75. 
5 Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that they are “without 
sufficient information or knowledge to plead the precise 
nature, extent and amount of the Defendants’ delinquency 
since the books, records and information necessary to 
determine this liability are in the exclusive possession, 
custody and control or knowledge of the Defendants.”  
Plaintiffs Complaint at 5 ¶17. 
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MRS to submit to an audit; (2) a post-audit judgment for any 
amount due with liquidated damages, interest, and costs; (3) 
post-audit relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1145 for any unpaid 
ERISA contributions; and (4) a permanent injunction 
compelling MRS to comply with the 2012-2015 CBA and any 
subsequent CBAs.6  
 
MRS moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on its conclusion that the 
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.7  MRS argued that it obviously did not sign the 
2012-2015 CBA and claimed that the assent letter could not 
bridge the critical gap.  MRS also challenged the complaint 
on the ground that it failed under Luterbach, a test the NLRB 
created to determine when an employer that does not sign a 
CBA can nevertheless be bound by the results of 
multiemployer bargaining.8  The district court agreed with 
MRS on both fronts and dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint.9  
This appeal followed.10   
 
 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
                                              
6 Id. at 6-10.  
7 According to statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during 
oral argument, Plaintiffs did not request an opportunity to 
amend their complaint.  In any event, as we explain below, 
even without amendment the complaint was sufficient. 
8 James Luterbach Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976 
(1994). 
9 Because of its conclusion that the complaint could not 
proceed, the district court declined to reach the issue of 
Marion’s personal liability as Vice President of MRS.  
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. 
Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 
2395152, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015). 
10 The district court had jurisdiction under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1132, 1145, and Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 185(a).  We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Our review of the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal is 
de novo.11  Thus, we employ the same standard as the district 
court.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) instructs us 
that a complaint need not amount to more than a “short and 
plain statement.”  In turn, Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party 
may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”  
 
 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly12 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal guides our inquiry.13  
Accordingly, we first outline the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim for relief.14  We then “peel away those 
allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.”15  Finally, we look for 
well-pled allegations, assume their veracity, and determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to a right to relief.16  This 
plausibility standard requires more than a “sheer possibility 
that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it is not akin to a 
“probability requirement.”17  In assessing plausibility, we 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.18 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
 The resolution of our inquiry turns on the answers to 
two questions:  (1) Did the complaint sufficiently plead that 
the letter’s evergreen clause binds MRS to the 2012-2015 
CBA?  (2) Does the NLRB’s holding in Luterbach nullify the 
2012-2015 CBA with respect to MRS? 
 
                                              
11 See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
14 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
18 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
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A. The Evergreen Clause 
 
We think it is clear that the assent letter at issue here 
functions as a me-too agreement.  Such agreements are 
“common and generally enforceable”19 contracts whereby an 
employer that is not a member of a multiemployer association 
agrees to be bound by the terms of CBAs entered into by the 
association.20  There is no distinction between actual and 
“me-too” signatories to a CBA.21  This allows individual 
employers to benefit from the terms of an association’s CBAs 
without actually having to get involved in the collective 
bargaining process.22   
 
MRS disputes the “me-too” characterization of the 
1997 letter.  But it does not offer any explanation as to why 
that label is a “misnomer,” and we can find none.23  The 
objection is meritless.  There is no doubt that the 1997 me-too 
letter attached to the complaint bound MRS to CBAs between 
the IFCA multiemployer association and the union even 
though MRS was not a party to CBA negotiations.  However, 
the question before us is which CBAs are covered by the me-
                                              
19 Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, Local 5 
v. Banta Tile & Marble Co., Inc., 344 F. App’x 770, 772 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (unpublished); see Constr. Teamsters Health & 
Welfare Tr. v. Con Form Constr. Corp., 657 F.2d 1101, 1103 
(9th Cir. 1981) (“It is clear that a signatory to a [me-too] 
Agreement can agree to be bound by future modifications, 
extensions and renewals of [a CBA].”). 
20 See Berwind Corp. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 
237 n.18 (3d Cir. 2002).  
21 See Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 188 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
22 See Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local 
395 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 
F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “the basic 
purpose of a ‘me-too agreement’ is to allow . . . employers to 
obtain all the benefits of the master collective bargaining 
agreement that is negotiated by the principal employers in the 
industry without having to participate in the industry 
negotiations”). 
23 MRS Br. at vii n.3. 
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too letter.  Put another way, we must decide how long the 
contractual obligations in that letter bound the signatories.  
Plaintiffs claim that the “evergreen clause” in the me-too 
letter extends the 1997-2001 CBA to the 2012-2015 CBA.   
 
Courts generally regard evergreen clauses as creating a 
perpetual agreement24 that can only be terminated with notice.  
“[I]f neither party terminate[s] the contract, it w[ill] be 
renewed automatically.”25  Here, Plaintiffs point to the 
following language in the me-too letter that they claim 
triggers automatic renewal:   
 
This Agreement shall be effective 
as of the date set forth below and 
shall remain in full force and 
effect for the duration of the 
collective bargaining agreement 
between the [union] and [IFCA] 
that is effective on the date of this 
Agreement and for the duration of 
any addition, modification or 
renewal thereof until one party 
shall provide to the other written 
notice . . . to terminate.26 
 
According to Plaintiffs, the commitment to be bound to “any 
addition, modification or renewal” is a prototypical evergreen 
clause that strictly binds MRS to all successor CBAs until 
MRS provides “written notice . . . to terminate.”  Plaintiffs 
claim that MRS’ failure to give the required notice of 
termination allowed the evergreen clause to continue in effect 
and that clause operated to bind MRS to the 2012-2015 CBA.  
 
                                              
24 See Holland v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 574 F. 
Supp. 2d 116, 123 (D.D.C. 2008) (interpreting an evergreen 
clause as creating a “perpetual obligation to contribute to the 
Trust at rates set forth in all ‘successor’ agreements”). 
25 Operating Eng’rs Local 139 Health Benefit Fund v. 
Gustafson Constr. Corp., 258 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2001). 
26 App. at A97 ¶2. 
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 MRS responds that, although Plaintiffs now rely on the 
fact that the me-too letter states that MRS is bound to 
“addition[s], modification[s], or renewal[s],” there are no 
allegations in the complaint that the 2012-2015 CBA falls 
into any of these categories.  Instead, Plaintiffs simply 
attached the CBA and assent letter to the complaint without 
explanation.  MRS adds that even though Plaintiffs 
subsequently attempted to make such allegations in their 
briefing, it is simply too late for such claims.  The district 
court agreed.  It explained:  “It is axiomatic that the complaint 
may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to 
dismiss.”27   
 
 However, that mistakenly ignores the fact that 
although the complaint did not specifically allege the 
existence of the evergreen clause in so many words, when the 
complaint is read in context with the attachments, the nature 
of the claim for relief is obvious.  A complaint need only 
contain allegations to give “the defendant fair notice of what 
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”28  Here, 
the complaint states:  “At all times relevant to this action, 
Defendants were party to, or otherwise bound by, [CBAs] 
with the Union.”29  In stating that MRS was “otherwise 
bound” to CBAs, Plaintiffs were clearly putting MRS on 
notice that the suit was based on the attached me-too 
agreement by the operation of the evergreen clause contained 
therein.30   
 
 Ironically, MRS’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
illustrates the sufficiency of this notice.  There, MRS argued 
that “attached to the CBA are . . . letter agreements . . . which 
                                              
27 Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. 
Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 
2395152, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015) (quoting Pa. ex rel. 
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 
1988)).  
28 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
29 App. at A23 ¶13 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. at A97. 
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purportedly bind MRS . . . to the CBA.”31  That is to say, 
MRS’ own motion establishes that it understood from the 
complaint that Plaintiffs were alleging that the me-too letter 
bound MRS to the 2012-2015 CBA.  MRS could hardly have 
been prejudiced by any lack of specificity in the complaint.   
 
 The complaint also satisfies the demanding 
requirement of plausibility.  As we mentioned at the outset, 
me-too letters and evergreen clauses of the kind at issue here 
are common contractual provisions in the construction 
industry.  The allegations are therefore all the more credible 
because they are consistent with prevailing collective 
bargaining practices.32  Put simply, this is far from an 
improbable set of allegations. 
 
Indeed, courts enforce such me-too agreements in the 
very manner the Plaintiffs seek in their complaint.  The Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Carpenters Local 
Union No. 345 Health & Welfare Fund v. W.D. George 
Construction illustrates this point.33  W.D. George involved a 
dispute in which the employer entered into a me-too 
agreement, the pertinent terms of which mirror the terms in 
the agreement before us.  The me-too agreement in W.D. 
George bound the employer to an initial CBA and to “any 
modifications, extensions or renewals thereof.”34  Ironically, a 
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund in a different locale 
brought suit to enforce the agreement in W.D. George.   
 
In agreeing with the union and concluding the 
employer was bound to a subsequent CBA that it had not 
signed, the Sixth Circuit rejected the very arguments that 
MRS advances here.  The court held that “[t]he [me-too] 
agreement does not merely bind a signatory employer to 
                                              
31 MRS Motion to Dismiss at 5 (emphasis added). 
32 See, e.g., Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 266 
(1983); NLRB v. Bos. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 80 F.3d 
662, 664 (1st Cir. 1996); Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement 
Masons Local 395 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Conquer 
Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1985). 
33 792 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1986). 
34 Id. at 66.  
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renewals of the same [CBA], but also binds it to 
modifications thereof.”35  In other words, me-too agreement 
evergreen clauses are to be interpreted broadly, to bind 
employers to successor CBAs even if key terms have changed 
or the prior CBA has expired.36  This reasoning undermines 
MRS’ position that its me-too agreement with Plaintiffs only 
applies to the initial 1997-2001 CBA.  
 
W.D. George also placed the onus of ending the 
contractual relationship on the employer.  In fact, it was 
precisely because the employer did not timely indicate its 
intent to withdraw from the bargaining relationship that the 
Sixth Circuit held that the me-too agreement extended the 
employer’s contractual obligations to the new CBA.37  In 
rejecting the employer’s arguments to the contrary, the Sixth 
Circuit repeatedly emphasized that the employer “did not give 
any notice that that [multiemployer association] no longer had 
any authority to bargain on their behalf.”38  Neither did MRS 
here.39    
 
MRS incorrectly claims that W.D. George is of little 
value to our inquiry because the Sixth Circuit decided W.D. 
George years before the NLRB released its ruling in 
Luterbach.40  As we explain in more detail below, Luterbach 
is distinguishable.  In Luterbach, the NLRB created a two-
part test for determining when a non-signatory employer is 
                                              
35 Id. at 69. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 69-70. 
38 Id. at 69; see also id. at 67. 
39 We see no reason to interpret the termination requirement 
here any differently than the one the court enforced against 
the employer in W.D. George.  In both cases, the agreements 
endure absent notice of cancellation.  Id. at 66 (The W.D. 
George termination provision stated in relevant part:  “This 
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect from June 17, 
1974 to April 30, 1975, and shall continue in full force and 
effect from year to year thereafter unless written notice of a 
desire to negotiate a change is given by one party . . . .”). 
40 315 N.L.R.B. 976 (1994). 
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bound to a CBA.41  However, the dispute in Luterbach did not 
involve an evergreen clause granting continuing bargaining 
authority, and the NLRB’s test does not account for such an 
agreement.  Indeed, the NLRB stressed that the Luterbach test 
only applies to resolve ambiguity about the employer’s 
commitment to be bound.42  No such ambiguity exists here. 
 
MRS also argues that the employer/union relationship 
in W.D. George was markedly different than the relationship 
here.  However, the purported differences are simply 
insignificant for our purposes.  Whether the employer in W.D. 
George was aware of successor agreements or received notice 
of negotiations was not dispositive.43  Rather, the contractual 
terms were determinative in W.D. George.  As noted earlier, 
those terms are not only analogous to the pertinent terms 
here; they are nearly identical.  Accordingly, we find W.D. 
George is very helpful to our analysis.  The district court did 
not even consider W.D. George in its dismissal—apparently, 
the case was never brought to its attention.   
 
W.D. George is not only helpful because its reasoning 
is persuasive; we also note that the case is no anomaly.  In 
Local 257, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
AFL-CIO v. Grimm, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that a me-too letter’s evergreen clause 
bound the employer to successor CBAs.44  It found that the 
letter provided a “continuous delegation” of the employer’s 
bargaining rights until proper termination, and no such 
termination notice was given.45  That is precisely the situation 
here.  
 
                                              
41 Id. at 979-80. 
42 Id. at 978. 
43 See also Cowboy Scaffolding, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1050, 
1051 (1998) (“Finally, that the Union did not notify the 
Respondent that successor agreements had been entered into, 
and did not furnish it with copies of those agreements, 
indicates only that the Union did not think it necessary to act 
as the Respondent’s agent in these matters.”). 
44 786 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1986). 
45 Id. 
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 Undeterred by contrary precedent, MRS presses on 
and argues that the text of the 2012-2015 CBA controverts 
Plaintiffs’ claim.  In MRS’ view, if the CBA included MRS, 
it would simply say so.  MRS insists that by the express terms 
of the CBA, it only applies to the union and to the IFCA and 
its members who authorized it to bargain.  MRS reminds us 
that it is not a member of the IFCA and claims it never 
delegated negotiating power to the association.  However, 
MRS’ claim that the 2012-2015 CBA does not cover it 
because this CBA does not mention it by name is belied by 
the 1997-2001 CBA.  That CBA contains nearly identical 
terms about the extent to which other parties are bound.46  It 
does not mention MRS by name either.47  Yet, MRS admits 
that it was bound by that earlier CBA.   
 
Finally, MRS makes a policy argument about the 
importance of protecting employers’ rights to bargain on their 
own behalf.  The argument rings hollow.  The Supreme Court 
has explained that “[n]either party is compelled to enter into a 
[construction industry] agreement.  But when such an 
agreement is voluntarily executed, both parties must abide by 
its terms until it is repudiated.”48  Nothing here suggests that 
MRS was somehow coerced or duped into entering into the 
me-too agreement clearly binding it to future CBAs.  The 
agreement was voluntarily executed, and MRS does not argue 
to the contrary.  MRS failed to terminate or properly 
repudiate the agreement according to its express terms.  We 
are therefore confident that enforcement of the me-too 
agreement in no way vitiates MRS’ rights.  
 
B. Luterbach 
 
 As we noted earlier, the district court swept aside the 
contractual language in the me-too agreement in the belief 
that Luterbach required that result.49  The NLRB created the 
                                              
46 App. at A107. 
47 Id. at A105-37. 
48 Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 271 (1983). 
49 315 N.L.R.B. 976 (1994). 
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Luterbach test in the context of “section 8(f) relationships.”50  
That section of the NLRA regulates pre-hire agreements 
between construction industry employers and unions.51  
Luterbach states that a non-signatory employer is bound by 
multiemployer bargaining with a union only if the employer:  
(1) was “part of the multiemployer unit prior to the dispute” 
and (2) “has, by a distinct affirmative action, recommitted to 
the union that it will be bound.”52  Failure to satisfy either 
element is dispositive.  Here, the district court found that 
neither requirement was satisfied.53  That is not surprising 
since MRS was not a member of the multiemployer unit and 
it did not perform any “distinct affirmative action” 
demonstrating its recommitment to a later CBA.54   
 
 Nevertheless, the district court’s reliance on Luterbach 
was misplaced.  Though the district court may well be correct 
that the 2012-2015 CBA does not pass the Luterbach test, that 
does not resolve this dispute because Luterbach does not 
apply here.   
 
 First, Luterbach is hardly binding on us.  As far as we 
can tell, in the decades since the NLRB decided Luterbach, 
we have only cited Luterbach once, and did so then only in 
passing.  In Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association 
Local 19 v. Herre Bros., we referenced Luterbach to 
distinguish 8(f) and 9(a)55 relationships.56  But because we 
                                              
50 CBA relationships involving construction employers are 
presumed to fall under § 8(f).  See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 240 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (describing the 8(f) presumption).  Neither party 
challenges this presumption. 
51 29 U.S.C. § 158(f); see Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239. 
52 Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 980. 
53 Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. 
Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 14-07097, 2015 WL 
2395152, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015). 
54 Id. 
55 Under § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), a union 
may become the exclusive bargaining representative of a unit 
of employees if a majority of employees designate the union.  
An employer with a 9(a) relationship to a union has an 
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determined that the agreement at issue there did not result in 
an 8(f) relationship, we did not actually apply Luterbach.57  
The jurisprudence of other circuit courts of appeals is not to 
the contrary.  The few circuit courts that mention Luterbach 
place no more reliance on it than we now do.58 
 
 Even if Luterbach were generally authoritative, it still 
would not decide this dispute because Luterbach is 
inapposite.  The Luterbach test determines the obligations of 
an employer “in a multiemployer unit,” whereas here, MRS 
was never a formal member of the IFCA.59  Furthermore, as 
Plaintiffs note, Luterbach itself expressly disclaims 
application to agreements supported by ongoing bargaining 
authority.  To make this point, Luterbach singles out other 
NLRB cases where an employer “obligate[d] itself to abide 
by a successor agreement” and explains that such scenarios 
are beyond its scope.60  These other cases are analogous to the 
one at hand.  
 
In Kephart Plumbing, an agreement was binding 
because an employer had previously authorized an association 
to negotiate with a union on its behalf.61  Here, the me-too 
                                                                                                     
obligation to negotiate a successor contract with the union in 
good faith.  See Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239.  No such duty 
exists in the § 8(f) context.  There are no claims that the 
relationship underlying the CBA here arises under § 9(a). 
56 Herre Bros., 201 F.3d at 239-40. 
57 Id. at 242.  
58 See, e.g., Haas Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 299 F.3d 23, 27 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 2002) (noting but not reaching Luterbach); NLRB v. 
Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(citing Luterbach as background but not applying it); Local 
Union 48 Sheet Metal Workers v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 106 
F.3d 970, 975 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We decline to reach the 
issue of whether Luterbach [is] viable in this circuit.”). 
59 James Luterbach Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 
(1994) (“The issue posed here is whether an 8(f) employer, in 
a multiemployer unit, is bound, by inaction, to the successor 
multiemployer contract.” (emphasis added)). 
60 Id. at 978 (emphasis in original). 
61 285 N.L.R.B. 612, 612-13 (1987). 
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letter provided that authority.  Similarly, in Reliable Electric, 
an employer that had not withdrawn bargaining authority 
previously given to an association was bound to the 
association contract.62  Likewise, it is undisputed here that 
MRS did not revoke the negotiating power it had delegated 
through the me-too letter.  
 
We appreciate that some of the particulars of the cases 
Luterbach distinguishes differ from the facts before us.  
These are distinctions without a difference.  For instance, in 
Reliable Electric the contested CBA went into effect directly 
upon the expiration of the prior CBA.63  That supports 
characterization of the second CBA as a “renewal.”  Here, in 
contrast, there was a gap of more than a decade between the 
first CBA (1997-2001) and the second (2012-2015).  
However, courts generally do not conclude that such an 
intervening interval undercuts an evergreen clause’s power of 
renewal.64  And rightly so; evergreen clauses keep agreements 
in force despite the passage of time.65  Ultimately, this dispute 
neatly fits Luterbach’s description of cases that fall outside its 
purview because they involve an employer “clearly and 
unmistakably [binding] itself to a successor contract.”66 
                                              
62 286 N.L.R.B. 834, 836 (1987). 
63 Id. at 834. 
64 See, e.g., Cedar Valley Corp. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1211, 
1220 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e find no link between periods of 
inactivity among the parties and the enforceability of the 
agreements.  Rather, the decisive issue is whether Cedar 
Valley affirmatively, and in compliance with the terms of the 
1978 agreements, revoked Associated Contractor’s authority 
to bind it to successive agreements.”). 
65 To the extent that the in perpetuity nature of an evergreen 
clause may be a concern, the signatories can easily add 
language clearly stating that the continuing authority arising 
under the agreement will automatically cease after a defined 
time frame, with no need for formal notice of termination.  
No such language appears in the agreement between MRS 
and Plaintiffs.  We will not judicially amend the agreement by 
adopting MRS’ argument. 
66 James Luterbach Constr. Co., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 
(1994). 
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This limitation on Luterbach makes eminent sense.  As 
the Plaintiffs point out, requiring a “distinct affirmative 
action” pursuant to Luterbach’s second prong in cases like 
this would void evergreen clauses.  They would be 
transformed into mere surplusage because they are intended 
to bind parties into the future without additional acts.  Indeed, 
Luterbach recognizes that applying the second part of its test 
to cases like this one would be like trying to fit a round peg 
into a square hole.  Luterbach explains that “[s]ome 
affirmative act is necessary to establish [the employer’s] 
consent” to be bound.67  In the same pronouncement, 
Luterbach recognizes that “there can be cases where the 
employer has expressly given continuing consent to bargain a 
successor contract on a multiemployer basis. . . . However, 
there is no such consent here.”68  In contrast, in the dispute 
before us the evergreen clause was the consent.  That is 
precisely why Luterbach does not apply. 
 
Subsequent NLRB cases confirm Luterbach’s 
boundaries.69  As the Plaintiffs mention, Baker Electric, for 
                                              
67 Id. at 981. 
68 Id. at 981 n.11. 
69 See, e.g., Taylor Ridge Paving & Constr. & Local Union 
No. 309, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 25-CA-135372, 
2015 WL 5564621 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 21, 2015) 
(“However, unlike in James Luterbach Construction, 
Respondent here agreed to bind itself to successor agreements 
by the operation of the [me-too letter].  Therefore, I find 
James Luterbach Construction distinguishable from this 
case.”); HCL, Inc. & Laborers Int’l Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 
Local 576, 343 N.L.R.B. 981, 982 (2004) (“Luterbach, relied 
on by the judge, is inapposite . . . . This is not a case in which 
the respondent was a member of a multiemployer bargaining 
unit.  Nor is this a case of an employer who did nothing to 
bind itself to a successor 8(f) agreement.”); Cowboy 
Scaffolding, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1050 (1998) (basing its 
holding on a finding that a me-too agreement “clearly states 
that the 1990-1993 contract . . . will automatically renew on a 
yearly basis thereafter unless either of the parties gives timely 
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instance, rejected application of Luterbach in circumstances 
much like theirs.70  Baker Electric held that an employer was 
bound to a successor CBA pursuant to a me-too letter with an 
evergreen clause.71  In doing so, Baker Electric rebuffed the 
employer’s assertion that Luterbach freed it from future 
obligations.  On the contrary, the NLRB explained:  
 
In Luterbach, the Board made 
clear that “there can be cases 
where the employer has expressly 
given continuing consent to 
bargain a successor contract on a 
multiemployer basis” . . . . Here . . 
. Respondent affirmatively bound 
itself to successor agreements . . . 
by the express terms of the [me-
too letter].72  
 
This classification of evergreen clauses as a dividing line 
between Luterbach and non-Luterbach cases illustrates why 
the district court erred in relying on Luterbach here. 
 
MRS urges us to reject Baker Electric for one reason:  
Whereas Baker Electric involved an absolute delegation of 
bargaining authority, there is no such provision here.  MRS 
claims it simply agreed to join a particular, and now expired, 
CBA.  There is no support for MRS’ position.  Baker Electric 
described the grant of authority in terms that do not vary in 
any meaningful way from those in the me-too agreement 
here.  Baker Electric portrayed its me-too agreement as 
“authoriz[ing] the [multiemployer association] as the 
employer’s collective-bargaining representative for all 
matters pertaining to the current ‘Inside’ labor agreement 
with [the union.]”73  The me-too letter here reads:  “The 
employer shall be and is hereby, bound by all of the terms and 
                                                                                                     
notice of an intent to modify or terminate” without reaching 
Luterbach). 
70 317 N.L.R.B. 335 (1995). 
71 Id. at 335, 340-42. 
72 Id. at 335 n.2. 
73 Id. at 340. 
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conditions of employment contained in the collective 
bargaining agreement between the [union] and the 
[multiemployer association].”74  For present purposes, the 
effect of each of these provisions is the same:  The employer 
is bound by agreements between the multiemployer 
association and the union.  Baker Electric thus applies 
squarely here. 
 
Moreover, there is nothing novel about our reliance on 
Baker Electric’s logic.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit enforced the NLRB’s order in Baker Electric without 
even mentioning Luterbach.75  In addition, as we noted 
earlier, even before Baker Electric the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit emphasized that an employer may bind 
itself to future CBAs through an evergreen clause.76  The 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,77 Sixth,78 and Ninth79 Circuits 
have likewise found that an evergreen clause persists in the 
absence of notice of termination.   
 
MRS’ primary support for its claim that Luterbach 
applies—Iron Workers Tri-State Welfare Plan v. Carter 
Construction80—does not make Luterbach relevant either.  
First, there is the obvious point that Iron Workers is a district 
court opinion and therefore not binding on us.  Second, Iron 
Workers relied on Luterbach because the employer provided 
notice of termination, thereby freeing itself from its 
                                              
74 App. at A97 ¶1. 
75 NLRB v. Baker, 105 F.3d 647, at *4 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(unpublished) (“Because the Company never effectively 
repudiated the § 8(f) agreement, it may be held liable for 
breaching its terms.”).  
76 See Local 257, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Grimm, 786 F.2d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1986). 
77 See NLRB v. Black, 709 F.2d 939, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1983). 
78 See Nelson Elec. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 965, 966-67 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
79 See Constr. Teamsters Health & Welfare Tr. v. Con Form 
Constr. Corp., 657 F.2d 1101, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1981). 
80 530 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  
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commitment to be bound.81  Without continuing consent, 
Luterbach poses the right question:  Whether the employer 
signaled an intent to be bound through an additional act.  But 
because cancellation of consent did not occur here, Iron 
Workers is irrelevant. 
  
IV. PLAUSIBILITY 
 
From the preceding it is clear that Luterbach does not 
stand for a rule that all me-too agreements must satisfy its two 
criteria in order to bind non-signatories to future CBAs.  
Rather, Luterbach is limited to cases that do not involve 
evergreen clauses or other continuing grants of bargaining 
authority.  Absent the conditions prescribed in Luterbach, we 
need only focus on the plausibility of the complaint under 
contract law principles.  As we explained, the district court 
was correct that the complaint leaves something to be 
desired—it does not directly say why the 2012-2015 CBA is 
binding on MRS.  However, we are not here to grade the 
complaint, but to determine if it survives a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  We have little trouble concluding that, 
taken together, the complaint’s allegations and attachments 
put MRS on notice and state a plausible claim for relief.  This 
compels us to “unlock the doors of discovery.”82 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On remand, 
the court can determine whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled 
the personal liability of MRS’ Vice President, Marion.  
Because of its conclusion that the complaint did not state a 
claim for relief, the district court did not address whether 
Marion bore responsibility, as Plaintiffs allege.  Accordingly, 
we will remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion in the district court. 
                                              
81 Id. at 1030 (“When the 2001 agreement was terminated, 
this being a section 8(f) relationship, Carter Construction had 
the option of refusing to bargain for a new contract.”). 
82 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
